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Health Theater
Govind Persad*
“Security theater” has been defined as an effort to “provide the feeling
of security instead of the reality.” The concept of security theater has
been discussed in both the popular press and academic literature, but has
not yet entered health law. This project suggests that a parallel category
of “health theater” picks out a set of practices in medical screening and
health care delivery that provide a mere simulacrum of protection against
medical risk, rather than providing genuine medical benefit.
Part I summarizes some of the distinctive advantages and
disadvantages of health and security theater. Like security theater,
health theater frequently comes at high cost; employs high technology in
place of individualized, personal assessment; and ignores differences
between individuals. And, as with security theater, health theater also
amplifies general anxiety and ignores the costs of false positives. Part II
discusses some of the advantages of health theater, including its capacity
to make patients feel respected and to produce psychological security.
Part III discusses three potential alternatives to health theater: hightouch medicine, precise targeting of diagnostic efforts, and elimination
of threats at their source. Last, Part IV considers how law could support
alternatives to health theater, focusing on changes in the financing of
health care, changes in liability regimes, and increased investment in
public health.

* Assistant Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, Bloomberg School of
Public Health, Johns Hopkins University. JD/PhD, Stanford. Thanks to Zeke Emanuel, Alex
Lemann, Andrea Wang, Robin West, Harald Schmidt, and participants at the Fellows Collaborative
at Georgetown University Law Center for their comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Most frequent travelers in the United States are familiar with the fullbody scanners used to screen airline passengers for firearms and
explosives. But the scanners’ comprehensive examination of travelers’
exteriors is also capable of detecting something of little danger to secure
aviation, but potentially great danger to health: unusual spots that, as
described in two recent medical reports, proved to be cancerous
melanomas.1 This surprising finding prompted one team of reporting
physicians to consider whether “airport scanners could serve as incidental
1. Paul Caine et al., A Desmoplastic Melanoma Detected by an Airport Security Scanner, 69 J.
PLASTIC, RECONSTRUCTIVE & AESTHETIC SURGERY 874, 874–75 (2016); Jonathan E. Mayer &
Brian B. Adams, Nodular Melanoma Serendipitously Detected by Airport Full Body Scanners, 230
DERMATOLOGY 16, 16–17 (2014).
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free screening for suspicious nodular lesions,” but they ultimately
concluded that current forms of airport screening are likely neither
specific nor sensitive enough to constitute a recommended strategy for
medical diagnosis.2
Concerns about the wisdom of screening are not unique to the unusual
situation where an airport security scanner detects a medical problem.
Nor are they only a matter of interest to physicians. Rather, concerns
have been raised by critics of the use of full-body scanning in airports to
detect security threats and by critics of its use in medical settings to
diagnose disease. These critics include not only scientists concerned
about the prevalence of false positives and negatives, but also policy and
legal scholars who are concerned about the costs and negative effects of
screening.
This Article, like the finding with which it began, connects the practice
of screening individuals’ bodies for threats to national security with
similar practices that screen for threats to health. It does so by extending
a concept from the security literature—Bruce Schneier’s idea of “security
theater”3—for the first time to the medical context. After defining a
category of “health theater” parallel to Schneier’s concept of “security
theater,” this Article explains how this category includes many screening
practices endemic to modern medicine, examines how current law works
to permit and even facilitate the spread of health theater, and considers
how changes in law could forestall its growth.
Part I summarizes some of the distinctive advantages and
disadvantages of health and security theater. Like security theater, health
theater frequently comes at a high cost; employs high technology in place
of individualized, personal assessment; and ignores differences between
individuals. And, as with security theater, health theater also amplifies
general anxiety and ignores the costs of false positives. Part II discusses
some of the factors that explain the prevalence of health theater, including
its capacity to make patients feel respected and to produce psychological
security. Part III discusses three potential alternatives to health theater:
high-touch medicine, precise targeting of diagnostic efforts, and
elimination of threats at their source. Last, Part IV considers how law
could support these alternatives to health theater, focusing on changes in
the financing of health care, changes in liability regimes, and increased
investment in public health.

2. Mayer & Adams, supra note 1, at 17.
3. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 38 (2006).
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I. SECURITY THEATER
A. Defining Security Theater
Cybersecurity writer and practitioner Bruce Schneier coined the term
“security theater” to describe and criticize security countermeasures that
“provide the feeling of security instead of the reality.” 4 Examples of
security theater that Schneier describes include armed guards at airport
security checkpoints and tamper-resistant food packaging.5 As security
and surveillance measures came to the forefront of the public mind during
the War on Terror, Schneier’s definition of security theater gained
currency in debates surrounding national security law and policy. The
title of a 2012 congressional hearing asked whether the Transportation
Security Administration (“TSA”) was providing “effective security or
security theater,”6 while journalists asked Department of Homeland
Security head Michael Chertoff whether “security theater is an important
aspect of actual security.”7
Members of Congress also employed the concept of security theater
during congressional debates over security efforts. Congressman Scott
Garrett criticized TSA searches of vehicles and passengers leaving, rather
than entering, ports as being “really not security . . . just security
theater,”8 and elsewhere described these searches as addressing “no
conceivable threat whatsoever and engaging in basically what really is
security theater.”9
Congressman John Duncan read into the
Congressional Record a Vanity Fair article that castigated many security
efforts as “little more than security theater; actions that accomplish
nothing but are designed to make the government look like it is on the
job.”10 These criticisms also received support across traditional
ideological lines, with American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
director Nadine Strossen criticizing searches of mass transit stations as

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. TSA Oversight Part III: Effective Security or Security Theater?: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and the H. Comm. on Transport. and Infrastructure, 112th
Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter TSA Security Hearings].
7. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Blogger Roundtable on the State and Future of Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. (Dec. 9, 2008).
8. 159 CONG. REC. H3178 (daily ed. June 5, 2013) (statement of Rep. Garrett), 159 Cong Rec
H3162-04, at H3176 (Westlaw).
9. 158 CONG. REC. H3631 (daily ed. June 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Garrett), 158 Cong Rec
H3618-01, at H3631 (Westlaw).
10. 158 CONG. REC. H735 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2012) (statement of Rep. Duncan), 158 Cong Rec
H735-01, at H735 (Westlaw).
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“security theater,”11 and Democratic Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren
indicating that she, too, found the searches criticized by Garrett to be
inappropriate.12
The concept of security theater also made its way into scholarship
evaluating the legal dimensions of the security proposals being debated
by Congress and by the public. For instance, the legal scholar Peter Swire
proposed that part of a “due diligence checklist” for evaluating
information-sharing proposals by national security actors should include
an assessment of whether such proposals constitute “security theater” that
provide only “the appearance of security.”13 Other legal commentators
criticized searches at airports (including the full-body scanners discussed
earlier), no-fly lists, and restrictions on items that can be carried onto
airplanes on the basis that they constitute security theater.14
Conversely, some scholars have defended these practices on the basis
that security theater can indirectly improve the functioning of institutions
by deterring rather than blocking attackers,15 or by shoring up public
confidence.16
B. Extensions and Analogies
Discussions of security theater have extended into areas of law
unrelated to national security. Notably, a Michigan Court of Appeals
11. Symposium, Eyes and Ears Everywhere? Privacy in an Age of Government and
Technological Intrusion, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 1135, 1135, 1139 (2015).
12. 158 CONG. REC. H3631 (daily ed. June 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Lofgren), 158 Cong.
Rec. H3618-01, at H3631 (Westlaw).
13. Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV.
951, 952, 965 (2006).
14. Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1255 (2010);
R. Gregory Israelsen, Applying the Fourth Amendment’s National-Security Exception to Airport
Security and the TSA, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 501, 539 (2013); see also Deema B. Abini, Traveling
Transgender: How Airport Screening Procedures Threaten the Right to Informational Privacy, 87
S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 120, 152 (2014) (questioning whether TSA’s current screening
procedures are necessary or if they are merely security theater); Richard Sobel, The Right to Travel
and Privacy: Intersecting Fundamental Freedoms, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L.
639, 664 (2014) (“[M]any air travel requirements and procedures represent what security expert
Bruce Schneier has called ‘security theater.’”).
15. Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830, 847–48
(2014); see also Jennifer S. Ellison & Marc Pilcher, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)
Deployment: Legal Challenges and Responses, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW. 4, 4–8 (2012) (concluding
that advances in technology will advance TSA’s security mission).
16. K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology
of Privacy and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 123, 166 n.167 (2005); see also
SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 38–39 (suggesting that “security theater scares off stupid attackers and
those who just don’t want to take the risk,” and can help reassure people who believe they are under
threat).
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concurrence criticizing the application of sex offender registration
requirements to past juvenile offenders castigates such requirements for
reducing sex offender registration “from a tool that empowers people and
communities to help protect themselves to a pointlessly life-destroying
piece of security theater.”17 In a recent Harvard Law Review article,
Adam Samaha suggests that requirements to show ID before entering the
voting booth may be “akin to airport security efforts that some call
necessary inconveniences and others call security theater.”18 Other legal
academics have applied the concept of security theater to social media
privacy,19 as well as to debates over protective orders in software
litigation.20
These extensions of the concept of security theater in new areas have
also led scholars to propose related terminology to describe activities that
create the perception of some other value without the reality. One such
example is “privacy theater,” which “seeks to heighten a feeling of
privacy protection without actually accomplishing anything substantive
in this regard.”21 Another is “enforcement theater,” which similarly
involves activities that purport to enforce intellectual property protections
without actually doing so.22
Despite its clear relevance to debates over the costs and benefits of
screening, scanning, and surveillance efforts that purport to improve
health, security theater and its analogues have been undiscussed in health
law. Only one passing reference exists in health privacy law, where
Frank Pasquale contends that unless health privacy law extends its
protections far beyond the current requirements imposed by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), it “risks
mirroring the ‘security theater’ that plagues homeland security
operations” by giving patients a false assurance that their health
information is protected.23
17. In re TD, 823 N.W.2d 101, 113 (Mich. App. 2011) (Krause, J., concurring), vacated, 821
N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 2012) (referencing SCHNEIER, supra note 3).
18. Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1592
(2012).
19. Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227,
234 (2012).
20. Lydia Pallas Loren & Andy Johnson-Laird, Computer Software-Related Litigation:
Discovery and the Overly-Protective Order, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 75, 98 (2012).
21. Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287,
310 (2008).
22. Andrew Rens, Enforcement Theater: The Enforcement Agenda and the Institutionalization
of Enforcement Theater in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 553, 572 (2012).
23. Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The Importance of Information Policy, 14
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 108 (2014).
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II. HEALTH THEATER
This Part proposes a concept of “health theater” parallel to Schneier’s
concept of security theater, and identifies the dangers that it poses as well
as the factors that promote its prevalence. This Article argues that
recognizing a category of health theater will help resolve legal and policy
challenges posed by health screening, diagnosis, and surveillance.
Health theater has many of the same advantages and disadvantages as
security theater, and the literature on security theater can help law and
policy respond to the problems that health theater poses. Generally,
health theater parallels security theater: it comprises the class of medical
interventions that provides the feeling of protection from threats to health
without the reality of improved health outcomes. Given the broad scope
of interventions that claim or strive to affect health, however, a simple
translation of Schneier’s definition of security theater merits further
specification.24 This Article focuses on systemic practices that are
regarded as justified by those implementing them and that have
population-wide effects, rather than individual instances of inefficient
health-care delivery or cases of knowing quackery.
The remainder of this Part examines health theater in more depth.
First, this Part considers its dangers, which include cost, harm to patients
and public health, degradation of medical professionals’ role, and the
production of overconfidence and complacency. This Part then turns to
some of the virtues of health theater, in particular its ability to create
psychological comfort for patients, to extend respect to patients, and
sometimes to substantively benefit individual patients.
A. The Downsides of Health Theater
1. Cost Ineffectiveness
Perhaps the foremost criticism of security theater has revolved around
its high costs. Some identify advanced imaging scanners—which create
detailed image of individuals’ bodies—as a primary cause of excessive
costs: one source reports their cost at $1.2 billion per year.25 Others
object to “puffer” machines—which attempt to detect explosives—as
costly and unreliable.26 Even defenders of security theater note that,
24. See SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 38 (defining “security theater”).
25. Israelsen, supra note 14, at 539; see also TSA Security Hearings, supra note 6, at 2
(statement of Rep. Darrell Issa) (“By 2013, TSA will arguably, by its own accounting, have wasted
more than $500 million of taxpayer money developing advanced imaging technology, or AIT,
machines.”).
26. Woodrow Hartzog, The Fight to Frame Privacy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1033 (2013).
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when assessing security technologies, “their cost—in terms of resource
allocation . . . —needs to be considered in the context of their overall
benefit.”27
The same criticism applies to the systemic medical practices that
constitute health theater. As early as 1990, commentators noted that
American medicine, like American society, is enamored of high
technology. Computerized body scanning equipment, sophisticated
laboratory procedures involving radiologic techniques, and electronic
monitoring of body functions are mainstays of medical diagnosis in this
country. These techniques are enormously expensive. Yet, in the words
of officials of the federal Health Care Financing Agency, “the evidence
substantiating the effectiveness of many such practices is frequently
questionable and in many cases entirely lacking.”28

The evolving armamentarium of medicine affords physicians
numerous technologies that offer the glitzy capacity to display the whole
body, but its evidentiary support is dubious. Concerns about the high cost
of high-technology scanning and diagnostic technologies have only
intensified over time. In 2000, a Southern District of New York opinion
observed that “advances in medical science have demanded ever more
sophisticated and expensive equipment for diagnosis and treatment.”29 A
more recent law review article discussing Medicare spending discussed
the high costs of “coaxial tomography (‘CT’) and magnetic resonance
imaging (‘MRI’) scans” and observed that both types of scans were
among “the top twenty most expensive hospital outpatient services for
Medicare.”30
Other commentators have recognized the burgeoning field of
diagnostic imaging as a particularly costly area of medicine with little
evidentiary support.31 As in the national security arena, whole-body
scanning appears highly popular while supported by limited evidence.32
27. Taipale, supra note 16, at 166 n.167.
28. Nancy E. Cropley, The American “Right” to Health Care—an Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 681, 684 (1990).
29. New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Saint Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
30. Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever: A New Construct for Regulating Overtreatment, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1287 (2015).
31. William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-Subsidization:
America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 311 n.104 (2009) (“The CT
scanner’s usefulness was never proved in large medical studies to be better than cheaper or older
tests. However, once doctors and hospitals have the CT scanner, they ‘have every incentive to use
the machines as often as feasible.’” (quoting Alex Berenson & Reed Abelson, Weighing the Costs
of a Look Inside the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, at A1)).
32. Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in the Era of
Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will Be the Primary Player, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI.
L. 38, 79 (2010) (“[T]he U.S. medical landscape is littered with FDA-approved innovations in
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Accordingly, national health care systems that focus on cost control, such
as the Canadian health care system, have taken steps to rein in the cost of
health theater.33
Just as security theater encompasses both advanced technology, such
as full-body scanners, and low-tech approaches, such as searches of all
passengers entering or leaving an airport, health theater similarly
encompasses not only technological interventions, such as MRI and CT
scans, but also more traditional proposals, such as universal health checks
at physicians’ offices. In 2009, the United Kingdom introduced plans for
universal “health checks, requiring primary care trusts to screen all adults
aged 40 to 74, roughly 15 million people, for diabetes, chronic kidney
disease, chronic lung disease, cardiovascular disease, and stroke risk,
regardless of their risk profile.”34 In 2013, the health checks were
“expanded to include risk assessments of alcohol consumption and
dementia awareness.”35 While no similar proposal has been advanced in
the United States, the Affordable Care Act’s choice to subsidize
preventive care—including routine screening—by barring participating
insurers from imposing cost sharing on preventive interventions is likely
to increase the use of routine screening on this side of the Atlantic as
well.36
Similar to universal screening of airport passengers, universal health
checks were adopted in the face of substantial criticism. Much of this
criticism focused on the opportunity costs of universal health checks:
apart from any affirmative harm health checks might do to patients, they
consume time and resources that could instead be used to provide other
medical interventions.37 Practicing physicians, for example, criticized
diagnostic and therapeutic technology that have been highly touted, expensive, and ultimately
shown to be worthless, such as the use of whole body CT scanning as a screening for asymptomatic
disease in healthy people, or routine chest CT scanning to screen for common malignancies.”).
33. Michael Roth, Comment, Universal Health Care: Concerns for American Physicians,
Using the Canadian Experience as a Model, 4 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 434 (1994)
(“Provincial governments limit the proliferation of hospital capacity and expensive diagnostic
equipment by funding them separately through the hospital capital and operating budgets, instead
of through fees per item of service.”).
34. Ingrid Torjesen, Government Prioritises Health Checks for 15 Million Adults Despite PreElection Promise to Scrap Them, 346 BMJ f2941, f2941 (2013).
35. Id.
36. See Micah L. Berman, From Health Care Reform to Public Health Reform, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 328, 330 (2011) (raising the concern that “the patient-by-patient approach embodied by the
[Affordable Care Act] is likely to be exceedingly expensive and the false-positive results produced
by widespread screening may lead to unnecessary surgeries and other medical treatments”).
37. See Theo Lorenc & Kathryn Oliver, Adverse Effects of Public Health Interventions: A
Conceptual Framework, 68 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 288, 289 (2014) (proposing
a category of “opportunity cost harms” in which “potential benefits which may be forgone as a
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the British proposal for universal health checks because they feared that
the checks “would divert general practices’ time and resources from sick
people to the ‘worried well.’”38 Scholarly commentators also raised
concerns about cost-effectiveness and the diversion of finite medical
resources:
Healthcare, including available time for general practice consultation,
is a finite resource. Time and money spent on health checks are not
available for other primary care provision. Although there may be good
evidence for targeted screening of people at high risk, the generic
approach of composite screens for the entire population could produce
many false positives and false negatives, might not be value for money,
and has the potential for harm.39

This section has focused on criticisms involving cost-effectiveness, while
the next section will focus on the danger of harm.
2. Harm to Patients
In addition to diverting resources from more effective medical
interventions, health theater might also affirmatively harm patients who
are screened. A recent review noted that
[c]lear patient harms have been identified from practices such as
screening for breast, prostate, and thyroid cancer. Similarly, magnetic
resonance imaging for uncomplicated back pain can lead to surgery that
poses net harm to patients. The risk of harm from overuse varies
depending on the disease, its treatment, and the rate of overuse of the
therapy. Unnecessary treatment burden (the activities required of
patients to access and use care and navigate complex healthcare
systems) is an additional negative consequence of overuse.40

One cause of harm is the propensity of health theater to produce false
positives. False positives can cause psychological stress, which
constitutes a harm in itself and can produce negative health effects.
Meanwhile, the imposition of additional screening and treatment that
frequently follows false positives can cause physical harm. One critic of
universal health checks noted that because such checks “offer a bundle of
tests to people at the lower end of the risk spectrum . . . . the pre-test
result of committing resources to ineffective or less effective interventions”); see also Wylie Burke
et al., Seeking Genomic Knowledge: The Case for Clinical Restraint, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1649, 1658
(2013) (“Healthcare systems must consider which screening and preventive efforts are worth the
cost, given that resources could otherwise be directed toward other healthcare needs.”).
38. Torjesen, supra note 34, at f2941.
39. Felicity Goodyear-Smith, Government’s Plans for Universal Health Checks for People
Aged 40-75, 347 BMJ f4788, f4788 (2013).
40. Daniel J. Morgan et al., Setting a Research Agenda for Medical Overuse, 351 BMJ h4534,
h4534 (2015).
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probability is low, with a high chance of false positives.”41 Ultimately,
“any benefits could be offset by harms produced through wrong
diagnoses and unneeded treatments.”42
One such example of the risk of harm from false positives involves
prostate-specific antigen (“PSA”) screening.
A positive PSA test is modestly predictive of the risk of developing
invasive cancer of the prostate but epidemiological modelling shows
that 1,500 men need to be screened to prevent one death from prostate
cancer and this death would be averted at the cost of unnecessary
surgery for 80 low-risk men whose quality of life would be seriously
impaired.43

The limitation of PSA tests reflects a general problem with tests in a
low-risk population: even if the rate of false positives is low in absolute
terms, it may still be high compared to the proportion of individuals who
genuinely have the medical condition under study. A recent law review
article observes that “[a]lthough the prostate test itself is just as accurate
for men under 30 as it is for men over 50, the base rate for prostate cancer
for men under the age of 30 is so low that almost all positive tests are
actually false positives,” and notes that
the seemingly constant shifts in medical policies and recommendations
regarding when and to whom certain diagnostic tests and screenings
should be given (e.g., breast cancer, pap smears) is based primarily on
concerns that medical testing on low risk and symptom-free individuals
yields a high false positive rate relative to the true positive rate owing
to the fact that the base rate for the illness in question is very low.44

Despite the acknowledged risks of PSA screening, phasing it out has

41. Goodyear-Smith, supra note 39, at f4788; see also Lorenc & Oliver, supra note 37, at 1
(“Perhaps, most obviously, some population screening programmes may produce high numbers of
false-positive results, potentially leading to substantial adverse effects in terms of psychological
stress and unnecessary treatment.”).
42. Goodyear-Smith, supra note 39, at f4788.
43. Wayne D. Hall et al., Being More Realistic About the Public Health Impact of Genomic
Medicine, 7 PLOS MED. 10 E1000347, E1000347 (2010); see also Burke et al., supra note 37, at
1657 (“In a more recent example, screening for prostate cancer by testing for the prostate-specific
antigen (‘PSA’) has become increasingly controversial because of evidence that it performs poorly
as a screening test, leading to many unnecessary and debilitating interventions in healthy men. The
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force has recently suggested discontinuing this screening
program.”).
44. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification: Bayesian Information Gain, Base-Rate
Effect-Equivalency Curves, and Reasonable Suspicion, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 99, 104 (2015); see
Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific
Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 889 (providing an example where a patient
who had a low likelihood of developing a serious illness is nevertheless provided with additional
screening).
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proven difficult.45
The recent controversy over whether mammograms should be
recommended for women under fifty years old represents another
instance of this debate over the harms of medical theater. In 2009, the
World Health Organization and the United States Preventive Services
Task Force (“USPTF”) both recommended that physicians cease to
routinely perform screening mammograms on women under fifty, on the
basis that the harms of routine mammograms for this age group
outweighed their benefits.46 These determinations, however, generated a
heated debate.47 In support of this claim, organizations and advocates
asserted that the harms of false positives, including invasive biopsies,
unnecessary treatment, and psychological stress, outweighed its
benefits.48 One article advocating delaying screening until age fifty
calculated that screening women every two years at age forty “would
result in an additional 0.7 breast-cancer deaths averted, 21 life-years
gained, 4,921 mammograms performed, and 470 false positive
mammography results requiring diagnostic imaging leading to 33 false
positive biopsy results.”49
In contrast, advocates of routine screening for younger women argued
that society should be willing to accept a large number of small harms—
such as the false positive mammograms and biopsies listed above—to
prevent catastrophic events such as death from breast cancer: “Screening
can be thought of as a kind of insurance. As with all insurance, there are
costs for protection against adverse events that have a low probability of
occurrence but could be catastrophic if they occurred without the
insurance.”50 Some population surveys showed the same willingness to
45. See Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice Guidelines and
Malpractice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 273, 276–77 (2014)
(describing how, despite the existence of a United States Preventive Services Task Force
“recommendation against PSA-based screening for prostate cancer,” less than 2 percent of
physicians “actually planned to stop using the test”).
46. U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, Screening for Breast Cancer: U.S. Preventive Services
Task Force Recommendation Statement, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 716, 716 (2009).
47. Micah L. Berman, A Public Health Perspective on Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH
MATRIX 353, 374 (2011); see also Breanne Sergent, Comment, Disclosing the Gray Areas of
Mammography: Should Women with Dense Breast Tissue Remain in the Dark About Breast Cancer
Screening Alternatives?, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 453, 469 (2013) (discussing different guidelines
regarding screening).
48. U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, supra note 46, at 716.
49. Robert A. Smith et al., Mammography Screening for Breast Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED.
e31(1), e31(3) (2012).
50. Id. at e31(2); cf. Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules:
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1559 n.59 (1992) (discussing
“the question of whether the health and social cost of tens of thousands of unnecessary surgeries
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accept many small harms to avoid a major harm.51 Ultimately, advocates
of routine screening prevailed in the political arena, with the Affordable
Care Act explicitly rejecting reliance on the 2009 recommendations,52
and recent legislation continuing to provide mammograms with no cost
sharing to women under fifty.53 Nonetheless, the USPTF has reiterated
its position that the evidence in favor of routine mammography before
fifty is weak.54
The debate over the harms and benefits of routine screening has taken
place in courts as well as legislatures. In a recent case, the Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed a jury’s verdict in favor of a physician who, in reliance
on recommendations from professional societies, did not provide a
mammogram to a woman under forty who ultimately developed breast
cancer.55 Some of the testimony that was identified as supporting the
verdict included statements by board-certified specialists that “early
mammography ‘misses most of the cancers’ and results in a number of
‘false positives,’ which can lead to additional diagnostic tests and, in
some instances, surgery to diagnose mammographic abnormalities.”56
Under similar circumstances, the Ohio Court of Claims found in favor of
a physician who did not perform PSA tests, crediting the testimony of an
expert physician who testified that “PSA screening has been controversial
because it has not been shown to lead to a decrease in the risk of mortality
from prostate cancer.”57 The physician also explained “that the
controversy over PSA screening has been fueled by the fact that PSA
screening may result in both false/positive and false/negative readings,
and because many unnecessary biopsies are performed as a result of the
imprecise correlation between PSA and prostate cancer.”58
The debate over false positives in medical screening has a clear parallel
in the security debate. One scholarly commentator observes that “[f]alse
each year outweighs the benefit of a few hundred lives saved”).
51. Lisa M. Schwartz et al., U.S. Women’s Attitudes to False Positive Mammography Results
and Detection of Ductal Carcinoma in Situ: Cross Sectional Survey, 320 BMJ 1635, 1638 (2000).
52. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-13(a)(5) (2010) (“[T]he current recommendations of the United States
Preventive Service Task Force regarding breast cancer screening, mammography, and prevention
shall be considered the most current other than those issued in or around November 2009.”).
53. Kerry Young, Mammography Provision in Bill Gets Mixed Reaction, CQ ROLL CALL (Dec.
22, 2015), 2015 WL 9283843.
54. Kerry Young, Task Force Repeats Lukewarm Mammography Finding, CQ ROLL CALL (Jan.
12, 2016), 2016 WL 123727.
55. Higgins v. Ranasinghe, No. 100722, 2014 WL 5386944, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2014).
56. Id.
57. Bingman v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 2014-06828, 2005 WL 3163945, ¶ 10 (Ohio
Ct. Cl. Nov. 2, 2005).
58. Id.
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positives which result in innocent people being detained, denied boarding
on airplanes, denied employment, or subject to additional investigation
not only inconvenience individuals and threaten constitutionally
protected rights, they also consume significant resources and may
undermine security by diverting attention from real threats.” 59 This
discussion identifies both harm to the individuals screened and costs to
the overall system as dangers posed by false positives.
Concerns about false positives have been directed at the TSA’s
MALINTENT screening system, which involves technology that
measures the reactions of passengers to questioning:
As false positives must be investigated just as stringently as other
threats to determine whether an actual security risk exists, the presence
of false positives undermines the MALINTENT system by devoting
scarce security resources away from actual threats. The severity of such
a drawback depends largely on how many false positives the system
identifies. As noted, currently available data suggests that the
MALINTENT system is running at about seventy-eight percent
accuracy level regarding malintent detection.60

Similar concerns were raised about other technologies used as part of
airport security efforts.61 As with false positives caused by medical
theater, false positives caused by security theater could involve both
psychological and real harm to individuals being screened. For this
reason, the National Research Council Committee on Commercial
Aviation Security recommended that “technologies that yield a high
volume of false positive results . . . should be avoided or used only in
conjunction with other devices.”62
In health contexts, another cause of harm is side effects produced by
the technologies used to carry out screening. As explained below, some
screening technologies, such as CT and positron emission tomography
(“PET”) scanning, expose patients to ionizing radiation that increases the
risk of cancers and other health problems. A recent medical article
examining the risks of CT scans raises the concern that “the increasingly
large number of people exposed, coupled with the increasingly high
exposure per examination, could translate into many cases of cancer
59. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 435, 475 (2008).
60. Lindsey Gil, Note, Bad Intent or Just a Bad Day? Fourth Amendment Implications Raised
by Technological Advances in Security Screening, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 231, 237 (2010).
61. Sara Kornblatt, Note, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 385, 406 (2007).
62. Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of
Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177, 228 (1999).
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resulting directly from the radiation exposure from CT,” with some
patients experiencing an increase in cancer risk of as much as one in
eighty.63 Similarly, a recent study on the use of PET scans to screen for
heart disease found that the radioactive isotopes injected into patients are
likely to cause future cancers, which must be weighed against the benefits
of screening.64 Courts have recognized the risk of radiation-induced
harm when considering whether physicians should be held liable for
ordering, or declining to order, CT scans,65 and whether the imposition
of unnecessary CT scans constitutes harm to children.66 Even an MRI,
which does not use ionizing radiation, poses some risk due to the
possibility of injury by metal objects in or on the patient’s body or in the
scanning room,67 as well as harm caused if non-radioactive contrast
agents are injected.68 Ultrasound is likely the safest form of imaging,
with few reported risks—though even in the case of ultrasound, the
general advice is to minimize unnecessary screening.69
Many of these concerns about imaging have been raised in the context
of security theater as well. Notably, the use of backscatter x-ray machines
has been criticized for potentially exposing patients to excessive levels of
63. Rebecca Smith-Bindman et al., Radiation Dose Associated with Common Computed
Tomography Examinations and the Associated Lifetime Attributable Risk of Cancer, 169 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2078, 2079 (2009).
64. Amy Berrington de Gonzalez et al., Myocardial Perfusion Scans: Projected Population
Cancer Risks from Current Levels of Use in the United States, 122 CIRCULATION 2403, 2403
(2010).
65. Powell v. Buncich, No. 2:11-CV-277-PPS-PRC, 2011 WL 4818526, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
11, 2011) (finding doctor’s “explanation as to why he declined to order a CT scan or other medical
imaging to be reasonable and persuasive, particularly given the risk of exposure to harmful
radiation”); Burns v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 974 N.E.2d 1291, 1292 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2011)
(“[S]ince a CT scan subjects the patient to radiation, its inappropriate use creates an avoidable,
slight but definite risk of cancer in the long term.”).
66. See, e.g., In re Joyner, No. 325263, 2015 WL 3766868, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2015)
(concluding that exposure of healthy children to unnecessary CT scans constituted exposure to
harm); In re Anesia E., 791 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 23 A.D.3d 465 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (similar); see also Conservatorship of Pers. & Estate of Maria B., 218 Cal. App. 4th
514, 521–22 (2013) (holding that risks of CT scanning justified medical procedure that would
obviate the need for repeated scans).
67. E.g., Morris v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 597 F. App’x 861, 863 (6th Cir. 2015) (describing
a case in which a metal oxygen tank, negligently allowed into the same room with an MRI machine,
“flew across the room into the bore of the MRI scanner, narrowly missing . . . the patient”).
68. Jennifer Marshall et al., A Comprehensive Analysis of MRI Research Risks: In Support of
Full Disclosure, 34 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 11, 14 (2007).
69. Hariharan Shankar & Paul S. Pagel, Potential Adverse Ultrasound-Related Biological
Effects: A Critical Review, 115 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1109, 1109 (2011); see also Archie A.
Alexander, “Just Scanning Around” with Diagnostic Medical Ultrasound: Should States Regulate
the Non-Diagnostic Uses of This Technology?, 16 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 22 (2007) (discussing the
potential risks of ultrasounds).
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radiation.70 Ultimately, these concerns were a cause of these machines
being phased out. In contrast, millimeter wave imaging, which uses
nonionizing radiation, is much less likely to pose a risk to patients—
though some have raised concerns about a lack of transparency regarding
the intensity of the radiation used.71
Physically invasive forms of screening also come with risks. Blood
draws, for instance, impose pain and have the danger of causing longerterm physical injury,72 even though courts are divided on whether they
are properly regarded as painful.73 Pap smears and pelvic examinations
for women can also be painful.74 Additionally, screening may cause
psychological stress by framing the disease screened for as an imminent
threat or prompting people to think about, and anticipatorily dread,
unpleasant outcomes.75 For instance, proposals to universally screen
elementary-school aged children for excessive lipid levels have been
criticized for ignoring potential screening-produced harms such as
70. Rebekka Murphy, Note, Routine Body Scanning in Airports: A Fourth Amendment Analysis
Focused on Health Effects, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915, 923 (2012) (reviewing “increased risk
of cancer, the TSA’s failure to ensure safety generally, the lack of independent oversight and
testing, and questions regarding the device’s functionality”); Robert N. Strassfeld, Special Topic
Introduction: Minerva at the Departure Gate, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 433, 436 (2013) (“Maine
Senator Susan Collins introduced legislation in the United States Senate to require that the TSA
contract with an independent laboratory to test the safety of its backscatter scanners.”).
71. John E. Moulder, Risks of Exposure to Ionizing and Millimeter-Wave Radiation from
Airport Whole-Body Scanners, 177 RADIATION RES. 723, 725 (2012).
72. Douglas S. Diekema, Conducting Ethical Research in Pediatrics: A Brief Historical
Overview and Review of Pediatric Regulations, 149 J. PEDIATRICS S3, S6 (2006) (concluding that
a “project requiring multiple blood draws for research purposes exceeds minimal risk, not because
it represents a danger to the child’s physical health but because of the pain and distress related to
multiple blood draws”); Annette Rid & David Wendler, A Framework for Risk-Benefit Evaluations
in Biomedical Research, 21 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 141, 164 (2011) (“[A] blood draw is
widely—and arguably appropriately—considered a minimal risk procedure although it poses a very
small risk of serious infection or permanent nerve damage.”).
73. Compare United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to “the
minimal pain and discomfort accompanying a blood draw”), and People v. Inman, No. F041824,
2004 WL 1472576, at *24 (Cal. Ct. App. July 1, 2004) (“[A] blood draw is a commonplace,
minimally intrusive procedure that involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”), with State v.
Scheffler, No. A13-0399, 2014 WL 4957113, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2014), review denied
(Dec. 16, 2014) (regarding as commonplace the proposition that “some pain is associated with a
blood draw”), and Nawrocki v. Linder, No. 08-CV-14-BBC, 2008 WL 4533681, at *2 (W.D. Wis.
Mar. 7, 2008) (“Having blood drawn can be painful, especially if the needle is not placed
properly.”). Notably, the leading Supreme Court case on blood draws concludes only that “for
most people, the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.” Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (emphasis added).
74. Amir Qaseem et al., Screening Pelvic Examination in Adult Women: A Clinical Practice
Guideline from the American College of Physicians, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 67, 69 (2014).
75. Russell P. Harris et al., The Harms of Screening: A Proposed Taxonomy and Application to
Lung Cancer Screening, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 281, 283 (2014).
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“dietary neuroses, family conflict, and [cardiovascular disease]
anxiety.”76 Similarly, screening for abdominal aortic aneurysms—a
potentially life-threatening condition—can cause psychological upset
and distress.77 But little data exists regarding the magnitude and
frequency of psychological harm due to screening.78
Concerns about harm have been particularly acute in the debate over
required universal health checks. A 2013 Cochrane review of universal
health checks concluded that they were “not associated with lower rates
of mortality or morbidity[,]” but “may increase the number of diagnoses
and the use of medications,” thus bearing out the authors’ concern that
“if general health checks result in unnecessary testing, treatment, and
labeling, they could be harmful.”79 The authors criticized the British
government for defending the provision of universal health checks
despite evidence against their effectiveness and observing that
“[s]creening [programs] for healthy people are justifiable only when
[randomized] trials clearly show that benefits outweigh harms. For health
checks, the trials seem to show the opposite.”80 They conclude that
“[d]octors should not offer general health checks to their patients, and
governments should abstain from introducing health check [programs] . .
. . Current [programs], like the one in the United Kingdom, should be
abandoned.”81
3. Physician Deskilling
The shift toward imaging and other forms of screening also may
encourage an increased reliance on screening technology by physicians
and reduced training in other forms of diagnosis and treatment, such as
patient interviews and visual, auditory, or tactile observation. Medical
commentary has lamented the decline of the physician-patient interview
in favor of high technology alternatives that are favored for their higher
76. Thomas B. Newman et al., Overly Aggressive New Guidelines for Lipid Screening in
Children: Evidence of a Broken Process, 130 PEDIATRICS 349, 350 (2012); see also Alan R.
Schroeder & Rita F. Redberg, Cholesterol Screening and Management in Children and Young
Adults Should Start Early—NO!, 35 CLINICAL CARDIOLOGY 665, 666 (2012) (criticizing proposals
for universal cholesterol screening of children).
77. Minna Johansson et al., Harms of Screening for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm: Is There More
to Life Than a 0.46% Disease-Specific Mortality Reduction?, 387 LANCET 308, 309 (2016).
78. Jessica T. DeFrank et al., The Psychological Harms of Screening: The Evidence We Have
Versus the Evidence We Need, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 242, 242 (2014).
79. Lasse T. Krogsbøll et al., General Health Checks in Adults for Reducing Morbidity and
Mortality from Disease, 309 JAMA 2489, 2489 (2013).
80. Peter C. Gøtzsche et al., General Health Checks Don’t Work: It’s Time to Let Them Go, 348
BMJ 1, 1 (2014).
81. Id.
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reimbursement rate or ability to conserve scarce physician time.82 Just
as pilots who frequently fly on autopilot may lack practice at dealing with
in-flight challenges, physicians who rely on imaging and screening
diagnostics may lack the capacity to diagnose patients effectively by
using traditional techniques.83 In contrast, physicians practiced in forms
of diagnosis that include patient interviews and engagement may be able
to employ technology more beneficially and cost effectively, rendering it
genuine health improvement rather than health theater.84
The debate between imaging and skilled judgment has been raised in
the context of national security and crime prevention as well. The United
States airport security system, which relies heavily on imaging, is
frequently contrasted with other systems that involve much greater
exercise of skill and discretion by security screeners, and much more
questioning and interaction with passengers who are potential security
threats.85 Some have argued for greater adoption of at least some of these
techniques in the American context, rather than a greater reliance on
imaging:
The country should . . . be employing and training thousands of extra
employees to implement a system of personal interaction. These airport
security officers will be spending approximately five minutes per
passenger questioning them about their travel plans, all the while
keeping an eye out for physical cues such as nervousness or eye
movement in order to determine which passengers should be separated
and be required to go through further screening procedures. The goal
should be to search out possible threats by personally interacting with
passengers just by having five-minute conversations with screened
passengers. Furthermore, the country should start phasing out full-body

82. Abraham Verghese & Ralph I. Horwitz, In Praise of the Physical Examination, 339 BMJ 1,
1 (2009) (“[T]he electronic medical record and advanced imaging technology have not only
seduced doctors away from the bedside but also devalued the importance of their role there.”).
83. Georges Bordage, Where Are the History and the Physical?, 152 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N
J. 1595, 1596 (1995) (describing contexts where reliance on imaging reduces physicians’ skill).
84. Priscilla J. Slanetz, Teaching Appropriate, Cost-Effective Care Using the American College
of Radiology Appropriateness Criteria, 86 ACAD. MED. e14, e14 (2011); Verghese & Horwitz,
supra note 82, at 1 (contending that clinicians “who are skilled at the bedside examination make
better use of diagnostic tests and order fewer unnecessary tests”).
85. E.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 163 (1999) (“In
conformity with standard El Al preboarding procedures, a security guard questioned Tseng about
her destination and travel plans. The guard considered Tseng’s responses ‘illogical,’ and ranked
her as a ‘high risk’ passenger.”); Timothy M. Ravich, Is Airline Passenger Profiling Necessary?,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2007) (“For years Israeli aviation security officials have focused
on airline passengers themselves. They screen passengers individually and personally in a process
taking hours per person.”).
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scanners and replacing them with security measures that have proven to
be more efficient and effective.86

Of course, the increased use of skilled judgment in screening will itself
require an investment of time and money, both in screening itself and in
training physicians or screeners. Routine security screeners in the United
States receive much less training than screeners elsewhere,87 and some
have argued that efforts to use skilled judgment in screening have proven
ineffective.88
4. Privacy Violations
A frequent argument against security theater is that it violates the
privacy rights of the screened individuals. Concerns about the ability of
imaging technology to produce and record images of screened
individuals’ nude bodies motivated concern about the use of imaging as
part of airport security.89 Some have worried about the storage of images
after the screening is complete, or the use of screening images to
stigmatize passengers or gratify the prurient interests of screeners.90
There is anecdotal evidence that both storage of images and the use of
scanned images to stigmatize passengers has occurred.91 Similarly, fears
86. Courteney L. Taylor, Touched by an Agent: Why the United States Should Look to the Rest
of the World for a New Airport Security Scheme and Stop Using Full-Body Scanners, 35 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 503, 524–25 (2013); see also Rebecca Tillery, Comment, The Changing Face of General
Aviation Security Regulation: What Is Being Done, What Needs to Be Done, and Why Does
Anything Need to Be Done in the First Place?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 307, 336 (2006) (discussing
the training necessary for threat detection as a way to improve airport security).
87. Justin Florence & Robert Friedman, Profiles in Terror: A Legal Framework for the
Behavioral Profiling Paradigm, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 431 (2010) (detailing differences in
security screening training between the United States and Israel).
88. TSA Security Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (Statement of Rep. Darrell Issa) (“GAO [the
Government Accountability Office] believes Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques,
or SPOT, program, which has already cost taxpayers $800 million, is ineffective and that Congress
should consider limiting funds for this program.”).
89. Roberti v. OSI Sys., Inc., No. CV 13-9174-MWF (VBKx), 2015 WL 1985562, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 27, 2015) (“[T]he public began raising privacy concerns over the detailed ‘naked body’
images produced by the AIT scanners . . . . Responding to these concerns, in late 2010, TSA
mandated that all AIT scanners be upgraded with Automated Target Recognition (‘ATR’) software,
which would modify the scanner’s images to display only generic figures.”).
90. Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does Airport Scanning
Violate Privacy?, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1274, 1283 (2013) (reporting concerns about the storage
of images and about scanner operators using the technology to harass female passengers).
91. Jason Edward Harrington, Dear America, I Saw You Naked, POLITICO (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/tsa-screener-confession-102912 (“Just as the
long-suffering American public waiting on those security lines suspected, jokes about the
passengers ran rampant among my TSA colleagues: Many of the images we gawked at were of
overweight people, their every fold and dimple on full awful display. Piercings of every kind were
visible. Women who’d had mastectomies were easy to discern—their chests showed up on our
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about the scanning of large quantities of information have been raised in
response to proposals by security agencies to search computers and
electronic devices.92
Medical contexts are less likely to generate concerns about privacy
insofar as imaging procedures and diagnostic tests are explicitly sought
by patients, rather than imposed on them. But proposals to require or
incentivize universal screening for various conditions generate privacy
concerns, particularly if insurers or others could use health information
in ways that are adverse to the screened individual’s interests.93
Furthermore, screening technologies tend to generate far more
information than physician-based interviews. For instance, the panel of
tests run after a blood draw will include information not only about the
medical condition that motivated the blood draw, but also information
that may be relevant to many other conditions. The same is true for other
screening procedures such as MRIs and genetic tests.94 Even if the
additional information is not revealed to the patient, there is a risk that it
may become accessible to others.
5. Overconfidence in Technology
Security theater, with the glamour of scans and extensive data, can
generate the illusion that we know more about potential risks than we do.
Commentators have noted that “too much security theater can result in
complacency and a false sense of security if such ‘feel good’ measures

screens as dull, pixelated regions.”); How Much Do Full-Body Scanners Show?, ECONOMIST (May
8, 2010, 10:11 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2010/05/full-body_scanners
(similar).
92. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a search of
a laptop at the border requires reasonable suspicion in light of the immense informational content
of computing devices); United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 57 (D.D.C. 2015), appeal
dismissed sub nom. United States v. Jae Shik Kim, No. 15-3035, 2015 WL 5237696 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 14, 2015) (concluding that an airport search of a laptop was inappropriate in part on the basis
that “the invasion of privacy was substantial: the agents created an identical image of Kim’s entire
computer hard drive and gave themselves unlimited time to search the tens of thousands of
documents, images, and emails it contained, using an extensive list of search terms, and with the
assistance of two forensic software programs that organized, expedited, and facilitated the task”).
93. Maria Asuncion A. Silvestre et al., Trade-Off Between Benefit and Harm Is Crucial in
Health Screening Recommendations. Part II: Evidence Summaries, 64 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY
240, 243 (2011) (“Screening results may have unexpected consequences for individuals, depending
on who is allowed access to information. Employment may be denied, insurance premiums may
be raised, and family relationships may be adversely affected.”).
94. Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the
Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 1, 4 (2013) (“[G]enomic information in the typical individual’s medical
record is likely to increase tremendously in the next few years as whole-genome sequencing costs
are reduced and personalized medicine becomes more common in clinical settings.”).
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are not also accompanied by real security strategies,”95 and that “[a]n
inherently intuitive allure attaches to scanning massive amounts of data
in dimly lit control rooms, using sophisticated algorithms and scientific
computer-matching methods to predict future behaviors and identify
suspect individuals.”96 While the other risks mentioned above constitute
the material costs of security and health theater—whether physical,
dignitary, or economic—the danger of overconfidence might be thought
of as an epistemic cost of security and health theater, in that it undermines
our ability to accurately perceive the facts. Of course, inaccurate
perception will also contribute to the material costs discussed above.
An analogous example where framing evidence as technological leads
to epistemic misjudgments involves the neuroscience evidence in court.
Some have raised the concern that evidence from imaging, or
neuroscience-based claims generally, is given more weight by jurors and
even judges than is warranted.97 A variety of factors may explain the
excessive persuasiveness of imaging evidence, ranging from presenting a
direct and unmediated observation of an individual’s brain to their
highlighting of structural, rather than functional, abnormalities.98
Some commentators on health screening have recognized the danger
of epistemic overconfidence posed by an overload of data. One article
criticizing the proposal for universal lipid screening has observed that
[i]n the expert panel’s report, the complex algorithms for initiating drug
treatment of lipid levels in children receive all the highlighted emphasis
that comes with large tables and long discussion. Indeed, the new
recommendation for universal lipid screening may divert attention away
from other important parts of the report, including the use of diet and
physical activity to reduce obesity.99

Similarly, some have worried that physicians may rely on evidence
from imaging technologies like MRI to the exclusion of other sources of
evidence, leading to misdiagnosis.100
95. Taipale, supra note 16, at 166–67 n.167.
96. Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Markets:
A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 450 (2008).
97. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008); see also So Yeon Choe, Misdiagnosing the Impact of
Neuroimages in the Courtroom, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1506 (2014) (reviewing a “number of
empirical studies [that] show that presenting general neuroscience evidence is overpersuasive”).
98. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging
as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1190–96
(2010).
99. Bruce M. Psaty & Frederick P. Rivara, Universal Screening and Drug Treatment of
Dyslipidemia in Children and Adolescents, 307 JAMA 257, 258 (2012).
100. Lawrence B. Marks, “Error Bars” in Medical Imaging: Stealth and Treacherous, 277
RADIOLOGY 318, 323 (2015).
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B. The Upsides of Health Theater
1. Diffuse Harms, Focused Benefits
Even if the total costs of health theater outweigh its benefits, its costs
frequently take the form of small harms and risks for the entire
population, while its benefits take the form of large gains for a few. For
instance, universal screening efforts may subject numerous people to
anxiety, cost, and false positives, but may save a few people whose
dangerous medical conditions would not have been caught, but for the
screening tests. Some have made the argument that imposing small costs
on many to avoid major harms is simply common sense in both the health
and security contexts:
[W]e can intuit several situations . . . . in which it would be far more
important to minimize [false negatives] than [false positives]. In the
instance of airport screening for weapons, we would prefer to endure
the additional delay and invasion of privacy associated with a full-scale
search of our carry-on luggage than bear the thought that more lax
screening might permit a terrorist to bring a deadly weapon onboard.
And in the field of medical diagnostics, type I errors—after which
additional testing can reveal the false nature of the initially positive
result—generally are also preferred over type II errors, which are likely
to give the patient a false sense of security and result in his foregoing
necessary medical treatment. We see that in both of these cases, the
cost of a false negative can be much higher than the cost of a false
positive.101

This argument might be extended into a challenge to the coherence of
the categories of health and security theater: if almost all interventions
described as theater benefit at least a few people, then the interventions
might be said to actually succeed in providing more than a simulacrum
of benefit, and therefore to fall outside the definition of health or security
theater. In response, one might distinguish two conceptions of health and
security theater: “gross” and “net.” Even though screening may identify
a few genuine threats or dissuade a few attackers—thereby producing
some benefits and therefore not counting as theater on a “gross”
conception—it still counts as theater on a “net” conception because it
101. Ann Morales Olazábal, False Forward-Looking Statements and the PSLRA’s Safe Harbor,
86 IND. L.J. 595, 627 n.122 (2011); see also Douglas Mossman, Analyzing the Performance of Risk
Assessment Instruments: A Response to Vrieze and Grove (2007), 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 282–
83 (2008) (“For example, if an airport metal detector beeps when an unarmed passenger goes
through (a false positive), a minor inconvenience results (the passenger gets wanded), but the
consequences of missing a weapon (a false negative) could be a hijacking or worse . . . . It would . . .
be foolish to lower the metal detector’s sensitivity so that fewer false positives occurred if doing so
would allow armed passengers to board.”).
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fails to diminish risk and harm when its costs are taken into account.
The evaluation of situations that involve widely distributed harms with
focused benefits has spawned two separate debates: one involving a
question of distributive justice (whether many small harms can be
aggregated to outweigh a few larger ones), and another involving a
question of democratic politics (whether a smaller group of concentrated
beneficiaries will tend to prevail over a larger, disorganized public, and
whether this tendency is objectionable).102 Turn first to distributive
justice and the question of aggregation. A perspective that focuses solely
on aggregate costs and benefits would routinely be willing to countenance
large harms to a few in order to avoid a much greater total of small harms
spread across many people. As such, an aggregative perspective will not
regard health or security theater’s tendency to avoid large harms to a few
at the expense of small harms to many as a point in its favor. The more
interesting question, however, is whether health and security theater can
be justified even if one allows for some restrictions on aggregate benefit.
Where the small harms imposed by health or security theater are
widespread enough, they are likely to also produce ill effects comparable
in magnitude to the harms prevented: one is no longer trading lives for
inconveniences, but lives for lives.103 In a criticism of profiling-based
security approaches, Jerry Kang makes this point:
[I]f profiling is being justified in cold, logical cost-benefit terms, we
should dispassionately consider how many statistical lives we will
actually save. Could we save far more lives by mandating head-curtain
airbags, reducing the national speed limit (thereby decreasing
dependence on Middle Eastern oil), discouraging smoking, and
encouraging exercise? To be sure, the possibility of death in a car
accident feels different than death in a terrorist act. The fear of the
former does not paralyze the nation; the fear of the latter does. But that
difference does not automatically justify what might end up being a
misallocation of life-saving resources.104

102. See generally IWAO HIROSE, MORAL AGGREGATION (2014) (providing an overview of
arguments regarding aggregation and distributive justice); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2002) (discussing
democratic politics and the power of concentrated interest groups).
103. Cf. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hile officials involved in health or safety regulation may naturally be hesitant to
set any kind of numerical value on human life, undue squeamishness may be deadly. Incremental
safety regulation reduces incomes and thus may exact a cost in human lives.”); STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 623 (1993) (“[A] costly
standard that seeks to save a few statistical lives more likely saves no lives at all . . . .”).
104. Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 195, 198 (2002).
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Similarly, some have argued that airport security measures could cause
more deaths than they prevent, by increasing the inconvenience of air
travel and encouraging passengers to select riskier modes of
transportation.105
Additionally, some of the harms of health and security theater—even
when they do not lead to loss of life—are far more significant than minor
inconvenience, and indeed significant enough to be worth sacrificing
lives for. Many consider patients who are willing to take risky
medications to avoid anxiety reasonable; it may similarly be reasonable
to risk some human lives to avoid serious harms. In the security theater
context, Kang suggests that profiling produces serious harms:
Just ask a young Black man profiled as a rapist; a Black woman profiled
as a drug mule; a Latino profiled as an illegal immigrant; a survivor of
the Japanese American internment profiled as a traitor. The leap of
empathy is difficult, so we must all try hard to imagine living the life of
a “false positive,” stopped at airports, bus stops, stadiums, skyscrapers,
and malls. Think about the time, the inconvenience, the insult to your
dignity. Think about trying to calm your children bewildered by armed
men pulling you aside. Now think about this happening every day of
your life.

While health theater does not involve the same close tie between false
positives and existing social disadvantage that Kang identifies, one must
similarly make sure not to devalue the serious burdens of psychological
stress and anxiety, as well as physical harm from overtreatment, imposed
by medical false positives. As such, even a non-aggregative approach is
unlikely to countenance a perspective on security theater that is
completely blind to the costs it imposes.
In contrast to the moral challenge of aggregation, the political
challenge of protecting the interests of the general public against the
lobbying efforts of narrower interest groups is more difficult. This is
particularly true because hindsight is selective: individuals will have an
easy time attributing a terrorist attack or an undiscovered cancer to a lack
of screening, but a difficult time attributing a stress-induced heart attack
or a radiation-produced tumor to excessive screening. Discussions of
interest group politics, however, have not asserted that the claims of
smaller groups should have priority over the interests of the public at
large. Rather, discussions around the intersection of screening and
interest group politics have focused on the practical difficulty of either
organizing the general public to protect its interests or blunting the power
of narrow, but well-organized, interests.
105. Jamie Belcore & Jerry Ellig, Homeland Security and Regulatory Analysis: Are We Safe
Yet?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 15 (2008).
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Scholars in both the health and security contexts have discussed
concerns about the power of interest groups to capture focused benefits
while imposing diffuse harms on the public at large. Scholars examining
the costs and benefits of airport screening have worried about the public’s
tendency to focus on a few high-profile cases of terrorism without
considering the costs of counterterrorism efforts, and the possibility that
political actors will exploit that tendency.106 Similarly, scholars in health
law have noted that interest groups who are more effective in pursuing
their interests than the general public at large frequently defend screening
initiatives such as universal mammograms.107 Some who raise doubts
about the normative desirability of universal health screening nonetheless
concede that it “might be difficult” to get rid of universal health checks
because “[s]ome doctors believe strongly in the benefits of health checks,
some earn a living through them, and there are many faces to be
saved.”108 Ultimately, however, most argue that society should work to
resist the public tendency to focus on a few benefits and ignore smaller,
but widespread, harms: “Disclosure and treatment standards should not
be creatures born of political lobbying that are nurtured through public
fear and sentiment. Rather, they must be products of rigorous scientific
research, crafted by knowledgeable and experienced medical
professionals, and based on objective evaluation of the data.”109
2. Perceptions of Fairness and Respect
Another factor that may favor the continuation of health and security
theater is that these practices both create a perception of fairness and
respect by involving everyone in the screening process. Even if universal
screening is not cost effective, it may appear fairer than no screening at
all or targeted screening because it does not leave anyone out of the
process. As Peter Swire observes,
Suppose that you have analyzed five proposed security measures, and
decided that none of them is effective at preventing an attack and all are
costly to implement. At the meeting, you are asked to recommend what
to do. One possibility is that the Secretary could appear before
Congress and say: “We have looked at all the options, and decided that
there are no security measures that are cost-effective, so we are going
to do nothing at all.” How will this approach play with Congress and
106. Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1489, 1496 (2012).
107. E.g., Jessica Mantel, Setting National Coverage Standards for Health Plans Under
Healthcare Reform, 58 UCLA L. REV. 221, 245–46 (2010) (recounting the effective lobbying
campaign by interest groups to require funding for mammograms).
108. Gøtzsche et al., supra note 80, at 11.
109. Sergent, supra note 47, at 482.
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the press? In my experience, not well at all. There is a great temptation
to show that one is “doing something” and to describe concrete
measures being taken in an area. In assessing a proposed information
sharing or other security measure, it is thus useful to specifically
analyze the extent to which a measure creates security or the appearance
of security.110

The physician Peter Ubel and his collaborators have similarly
identified a public tendency to prefer universal measures—even if they
ultimately save fewer lives—over more targeted measures that save more
lives. In one study, members of the public preferred to offer a screening
test to the entire population, even when doing so would lead to fewer lives
saved, rather than the use of a more effective screening test, but only for
half of the population.111 Many respondents described this preference as
being grounded in a desire to treat everyone equitably or fairly. 112
The possibility of invidious discrimination is another concern
associated with moving away from universal screening and imaging,
toward greater exercise of skill and discretion. Concerns about profiling
formed a major part of the objection to shifting away from universal,
imaging-based airport screening toward alternative approaches. While,
as noted above, the medical industry may face a lesser amount of
concerns about profiling—insofar as patients are actively seeking out
screening—there may still be concerns that efforts to target screening,
rather than providing it universally, will allow either unconscious or
conscious bias to exert a harmful effect.113
3. Psychological Comfort
A major argument offered in defense of security theater has been its
capacity to provide psychological comfort. If individuals feel protected
from harm, even if they are no more protected overall than before, this
feeling of protection may be a benefit sufficient to justify some of the
costs of health or security theater. Several discussions of security theater
have made this point. For instance, Peter Swire suggests that, under some
circumstances,

110. Swire, supra note 13, at 965.
111. Peter A. Ubel et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in a Setting of Budget Constraints: Is It
Equitable?, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1174 (1996).
112. Id. at 1176.
113. E.g., Christopher V. Almario et al., Examining the Effectiveness of an Opt-in Approach to
Prenatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus Screening, 202 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
159.e1, 159.e5 (2010) (“[T]he opt-in approach may allow a physician’s bias about a patient’s risk
for HIV to become an issue.”).
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the appearance of security is itself a reasonable goal. For instance,
Schneier mentions that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, “the U.S.
government posted armed National Guard troops at airport checkpoints
. . . (but were smart enough not to give them bullets).” It seems to me
quite possible that such a measure was beneficial in establishing calm
and promoting trust in air travel immediately after the attacks. In such
instances, a moderate amount of theater may produce a moderate
amount of good, in restoring calm and confidence.114

Similarly, K.A. Taipale suggests that security theater can help
“maintain confidence in systems and allow for normal functioning” and
“policy makers must also consider whether making passengers feel safer
is important for maintaining the viability of the economic, transportation
or other systems regardless of whether it actually increases security
against a specific threat.”
The justification for security theater on the basis of its ability to create
a feeling of psychological comfort was even embraced publicly by
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, who suggested in a
roundtable discussion that “visible security does have a role to play
because I think it does inspire a sense of confidence.”115
Defenses of health screening have similarly relied on the claim that
screening can improve psychological comfort by making patients who
are screened feel like their health is being attended to. For instance, one
study of cervical cancer screening among women who had recently
immigrated to Scandinavia reported that the regular screening “gave them
a feeling of security that they were being checked.” 116 Another study
among military reservists similarly suggested that “involving this group
in mental health screening may increase their feeling of being supported
by the military.”117 Some have also found that participating in health
screening programs improves patients’ perceived control over their own
health and also improves self-efficacy and responsibility.118 As the
placebo effect suggests, these effects could also work to improve health
itself.

114. Swire, supra note 13, at 965–66.
115. Press Release, supra note 7.
116. Fatima Azerkan et al., When Life Got in the Way: How Danish and Norwegian Immigrant
Women in Sweden Reason about Cervical Screening and Why They Postpone Attendance, 10 PLOS
ONE 1, 12 (2015).
117. Samantha Bull et al., Medical and Welfare Officers Beliefs About Post-Deployment
Screening for Mental Health Disorders in the UK Armed Forces: A Qualitative Study, 15 BMC
PUB. HEALTH 1, 7 (2015).
118. Judith A. Cook et al., Health Risks and Changes in Self-Efficacy Following Community
Health Screening of Adults with Serious Mental Illnesses, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2015).
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The gains in psychological comfort from screening must, of course, be
balanced against potential risks. While health and security theater can
produce psychological comfort and security and can give individuals a
sense of mastery over their own situation, they can also enhance
individuals’ sense of vulnerability. For example, the United States Food
and Drug Administration valued the reduction in anxiety caused by
reducing the propensity of mammograms to produce false-positive tests
at $12.7 million.119 Similarly, security theater can also produce a feeling
of anxiety and fear by exacerbating the perception that terrorism is a
major and impending threat.
The reverse is also possible, namely that security and health theater
could induce a false sense of security that prevents a rapid response to
genuine, serious threats. One commentator on security theater contends
that it “soothes public concerns at a time of fear and unease, but also dulls
the senses.”120 Numerous commentators have raised similar concerns
that medical screening can induce a false sense of security in physicians
and patients. For instance, some have suggested that screening newborns
for hearing loss may lead physicians and patients to incorrectly conclude
that any risk of lost hearing has been eliminated.121 Others have raised
similar concerns about the capacity of self-screening via breast selfexaminations, or cholesterol screening as part of a universal program, to
create a false sense of security in patients in whom no abnormalities are
found.122
III. ALTERNATIVES TO HEALTH THEATER
Part II.A identifies concerns about the spread of health theater. But,
for these concerns to matter, some workable alternative to health theater
must exist. This Part examines alternative strategies that might be
adopted to pursue the same goal—security against threats to health—that
health theater aims at, but arguably fails to realize.
A. High Touch
Some critics of the expansion of high-technology screening in health
have instead called for a return to, and reinvigoration of, “high-touch”
119. Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1446 (2014).
120. Kline, supra note 96, at 449.
121. Jack L. Paradise, Universal Newborn Hearing Screening: Should We Leap Before We
Look?, 103 PEDIATRICS 670, 671 (1999).
122. Joan Austoker, Breast Self Examination: Does Not Prevent Deaths Due to Breast Cancer,
But Breast Awareness Is Still Important, 326 BMJ 1, 1 (2003); Irene M. Strychar et al., Impact of
Receiving Blood Cholesterol Test Results on Dietary Change, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 103,
109 (1998).
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medical practice. High-touch medicine involves increased interaction
between health care professionals and patients rather than the use of
technological screening. Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, a physician and former
White House health policy advisor, is a prominent advocate of the hightouch approach and has argued that high-touch medicine can improve
patient satisfaction and health while limiting costs.123 The high-touch
approach that Emanuel advocates for would have physicians spend more
time talking to, and interacting with, patients via “extended office hours,
use of e-mail and online visits, same day appointments and house calls,”
and would also expand the number and use of other medical
professionals, such as nurses and care coordinators, to ensure that patients
receive more in-person interaction.124 In a New York Times opinion
article, Emanuel and other physicians argued for the application of hightouch approaches to cancer care:
[W]e need more “high touch” oncology practices. In these practices,
nurses manage common symptoms before they escalate to the point that
they require visits to the emergency room, and doctors talk with patients
about palliative-care services and end-of-life preferences early on—not
in the weeks before death. These services are frequently not paid for
by insurers but can improve the quality of care and save significant
money by averting repeated tests, hospitalizations and futile, toxic
chemotherapy. Insurers need to share the resulting savings, enabling
physicians to invest in providing these services.125

Though high-touch medicine deemphasizes the use of high-technology
screening tests,126 it does not eschew technology entirely; rather, it calls
for the use of technology and data analytics to store and analyze the data
collected through these physician-patient interactions.127
Others discussing medical practice have similarly defined high-touch
approaches and contrasted them with alternatives:
What do I mean by high-touch medicine? I mean medicine based on a
carefully constructed medical history coupled with a pertinent physical
examination and critical assessment of the information thus obtained.
123. Bernie Monegain, Emanuel Proposes Vision for Doing More with Less in Healthcare,
HEALTHCARE FIN. (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/emanuelproposes-vision-doing-more-less-healthcare.
124. Id.; see also Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Saving by the Bundle, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011, 7:55
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/saving-by-the-bundle/ (discussing how
cost control can be combined with quality improvement for health care).
125. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, A Plan to Fix Cancer Care, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2013, 2:02 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/a-plan-to-fix-cancer-care/.
126. Emanuel, supra note 124 (“Additional savings come from referring patients to carefully
selected specialists, ones who don’t order a battery of tests and procedures for every patient.”).
127. Id.
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One then determines which studies, if any, are indicated. And if studies
are deemed necessary, the simpler ones are ordered first. In
comparison, high-tech medicine essentially bypasses the medical
history and physical examination, and, primarily on the basis of the
patient’s chief complaint, goes directly to a slew of tests that typically
include magnetic resonance imaging or computed tomography, or
both.128

This approach to high-touch medicine connects it to the approach to
medical practice promoted by William Osler, which regards effective
medicine as based on knowledge of how patients’ individual
circumstances affect their medical condition.129
High touch, of course, is not without problems.130 Current educational
and hiring models might not be up to the task of providing the needed
skilled personnel.131 Current physicians, for instance, might lack
adequate training in the examination and interpersonal skills that will be
essential in a high-touch environment.132 While changes in medical
education—such as innovative models that emphasize high-touch skills
and revisions to the medical school application and admissions process
that stress interpersonal and humanistic competence133—could fill the
gap in the long run, this shortfall could make the transition to high-touch
medicine challenging. As noted before, high-touch approaches—by
allowing greater room for discretionary judgments—might also open the
door to bias.134 And patients who have grown accustomed to the glitz of
high-tech testing and screening technologies may balk at the shift toward
the high-touch model—a risk that Emanuel and co-author Victor Fuchs
note in their work:
[United States] patients prefer high technology over high touch. As the
energy crisis highlights, Americans tend to embrace technologic fixes
for problems. [United States] culture emphasizes the new and the
fancy; old and plain is equated with deprivation. In the medical sphere,
128. Herbert L. Fred, Hyposkillia: Deficiency of Clinical Skills, 32 TEX. HEART INST. J. 255,
255–56 (2005).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 255 (discussing the deficiency of clinical skills in the medical profession).
131. Compare the similar observation in the security theater context raised in Florence &
Friedman, supra note 87, at 430–31 (discussing the much more extensive education and training
provided to Israeli security screening personnel and concluding that “to implement an aviation
security program in the United States that paralleled the Israeli model would present massive
logistical difficulties and significant financial costs”).
132. See Fred, supra note 128, at 255.
133. Darrell G. Kirch, Transforming Admissions: The Gateway to Medicine, 308 JAMA 2250,
2251 (2012); Verghese & Horwitz, supra note 82.
134. See Almario, supra note 113, at 159.e5 (“[T]he opt-in approach may allow a physician’s
bias about a patient’s risk for HIV to become an issue.”).
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this cultural value informs a patient perception that doing more tests and
receiving more treatments and interventions is receiving better care.135

B. Precise Targeting
While high-touch efforts represent an important alternative to health
theater, the gains from technology in medicine are real and substantial.
Detailed physician-patient interactions cannot, and should not,
completely replace medical technology as a diagnostic tool. Rather,
physicians could use medical screening technologies more effectively by
targeting their application to those who can benefit most.
As Emanuel suggests in his proposal that data analytics should be
integrated with high-touch medicine, improvements in computing can
help to target screening and other efforts more precisely. Just as the
conversations involved in high-touch medicine help generate more
information about patients, computational approaches can help
physicians identify the medical implications of that information. For
instance, computational techniques that employ natural language
processing can analyze electronic medical records to identify patterns that
correlate with medical outcomes.136 Data analytics could also help
physicians select treatment options for patients by providing them with
real-time guidance in making decisions drawn from expert clinical
practice.137 And it could allow public health screening initiatives to be
targeted more narrowly at the populations most at risk of a given
illness.138
One example of the use of computing technology to target medical
diagnosis and health care more precisely is the recent Institute of
Medicine proposal for a “health care system that learns.”139 This
proposal advocates for the use of “new tools, such as online patient
portals, to gather and assess patients’ perspectives and use the
information to improve their care delivery,” and suggests that data
generated in the care delivery process be analyzed to improve future

135. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 JAMA
2789, 2790 (2008).
136. Travis B. Murdoch & Allan S. Detsky, The Inevitable Application of Big Data to Health
Care, 309 JAMA 1351, 1352 (2013).
137. Id.
138. See id. (describing how medical data could be used to further public health initiatives to
reduce smoking and obesity by targeting the appropriate people based on their social media
profiles).
139. Mark Smith et al., What’s Needed Is a Health Care System That Learns: Recommendations
from an IOM Report, 308 JAMA 1637, 1637 (2012).
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care.140
Targeting programs more narrowly also can be more cost-effective. A
recent article argued for replacing the embattled proposal for universal
health checks in the United Kingdom with targeted health checks, noting
that “guidelines only support the actual management of those at high risk,
not universal health checks. Since a targeted approach will identify and
manage the high risk equally effectively, but far more cost effectively,
this is a good alternative.”141
Use of technology in targeting may raise the concern that this
additional technology simply amounts to a new form of health theater.
What differentiates targeting from health theater, however, is its use of
technology in data analysis and precise targeting, rather than health
theater’s promiscuous collection of data—much of which lacks
diagnostic significance. Additionally, the data collection strategies used
in targeted methods involve patients in the collection of their data or
analyze information contained in a patient’s electronic medical record—
information that would have been collected in any case as part of clinical
care. This contrasts with health theater, which treats patients as mere
sources of information and employs screening and imaging technologies
that inconvenience them or put them at additional risk. Rather than
stopping patient care to engage in the theatrical performance of
technological screening, targeted approaches collect the information
elicited during patient care and allow physicians to learn from that
information and apply it in real time during patient encounters.
A more justified concern is that targeting efforts will necessarily be
imperfect and may ossify existing biases. Concerns about the ways in
which targeted surveillance and security measures can reify existing
biases have arisen in debates over “predictive policing,” which targets
police surveillance toward areas identified as high crime.142
Other commentators on algorithmic surveillance have noted that any
algorithm designed to help decision makers learn from data is ultimately
only as good as its designers: if the analysis of data selectively
emphasizes the wrong information, or if data analysis is based on
140. Id. at 1638.
141. Andrew Dalton et al., The NHS Health Check Programme: A Comparison Against
Established Standards for Screening, 64 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 520, 520–21 (2014).
142. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing
“High-Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 196 n.107 (2011) (“[W]ithout oversight, a data-driven
approach creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: the increase in police presence in a specific high-crime
area results in more arrests in that area. With more arrests taking place, analysts have more
evidence that it is a higher-crime area, which means more targeting and more officers. One can
create a permanent high-crime area with such a self-perpetuating, numbers-driven system.”).
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incomplete or selective information, it may make outcomes worse rather
than better.143
C. Eliminating Threats
The most powerful alternative to both health theater and other health
care strategies is eliminating the threat to health at issue. In the security
arena, the analogous strategy is frequently costly and controversial. One
example of a threat-elimination strategy is the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, which granted the President the power to use force
“against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.” 144 Yet the Supreme
Court and other courts have skeptically noted the open-ended and
indefinite nature of the War on Terror.145 Commentators have also
argued that the War on Terror was not a cost-effective way of improving
security.146 Meanwhile, even foes of the War on Terror frequently argue
not for continued screening, but for alternative ways of eliminating
security threats that focus on the “root causes” of terrorism, hypothesized
to include poverty, oppression, and lack of education.147 It is doubtful,
143. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY
L.J. 259, 318 (2012) (“However, in 2011, an internal governmental audit discovered the existence
of 79,000 police memos in which potential crimes were recorded, but not counted in the crime
statistics. This trove of documents called into question the scope of the crime reduction, as many
potential crimes were simply not inputted into the computer system.”); see also Tal Z. Zarsky,
Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1391 (2014) (“For
instance, at some points, analysts must decide which correlations and patterns should be
incorporated into the scoring model and which must be set aside as ‘junk,’ random results, or
statistical errors. Here, the analyst’s biases might shape the final outcome and the discriminatory
effect it will involve.”).
144. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
145. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (“[T]he national security
underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and malleable.”); Ali
v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, J., concurring) (“Our Nation’s ‘war on
terror’ started twelve years ago, and it is likely to continue throughout [the petitioner’s] natural
life.”); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We cannot simply suspend or
restrict civil liberties until the War on Terror is over, because the War on Terror is unlikely ever to
be truly over.”); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring)
(discussing “the potentially endless duration of our current ‘war on terror’”).
146. E.g., LINDA J. BILMES & JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE
TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT, at x (2008) (estimating the cost of the War in Iraq to be three
trillion dollars, a cost that is largely hidden from American taxpayers).
147. E.g., David Cortright, Winning Without War: Nonmilitary Strategies for Overcoming
Violent Extremism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 218 (2012) (arguing for “a more
holistic approach that prioritizes development, human rights, and democratic governance”).

14_PERSAD_DOCUMENT9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

618

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

2/10/2017 2:16 PM

[Vol. 48

though, that any of these threat-elimination strategies will prove
sufficient to obviate the need for some form of security screening.
In the health context, however, some threat-elimination strategies have
been far more successful and have the potential to be tremendously cost
effective.148 Most notable have been the efforts to eliminate infectious
diseases such as malaria and smallpox, which have in turn removed the
need to conduct broad screening for these conditions. While eliminating
HIV/AIDS entirely is likely to be far more difficult, progress has been
made toward that goal as well.149
As with the elimination of security threats, the mechanisms for
eliminating health threats, and the personnel and resources needed, are
likely to be quite different from those needed for screening efforts. For
instance, the problem of tobacco smoking was not addressed purely, or
even primarily, through the work of health care professionals; rather,
tobacco control was implemented via public health strategies such as
tobacco taxation, regulation, and antismoking campaigns. 150
IV. ENDING HEALTH THEATER
If health theater is ultimately an unjustified practice, and there are good
alternatives to health theater, the next question that presents itself is how
health theater can be replaced with a better alternative. This Part
examines three strategies for ending health theater. The first involves
restructuring the funding of health care to disincentivize the provision of
health theater. The second involves changing regimes of legal liability
and responsibility. And the third invigorates public health efforts to
eliminate the conditions that promote the need for health theater.
A. Redesigning Funding
Health theater could be discouraged via the removal of financial and
funding incentives that favor it. Efforts to discourage health theater
through changing funding involve two distinct, but complementary,
strategies. One set of strategies aims to decrease the quantity of funding
flowing to health theater, while another set of strategies aims to increase

148. See Scott Barrett, Eradication Versus Control: The Economics of Global Infectious
Disease Policies, 82 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 683, 684 (2004) (arguing, by analyzing the
eradication of smallpox, that for eradication of a pathogen should only be considered it must be
“technically and biologically feasible, yield a benefit in excess of the cost, and have political
commitment behind it”).
149. Anthony S. Fauci et al., HIV-AIDS: Much Accomplished, Much to Do, 14 NATURE
IMMUNOLOGY 1104, 1107 (2013).
150. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing public health alternatives to health theater in more depth).
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the funding that flows toward alternatives.
Current health care financing models, many of which pay professionals
per procedure, create incentives for elaborate performances of health
theater. Some health law scholars have noted the connection between
these financing models and overuse of screening and imaging
technology: “Another motivation for the excessive use of diagnostic
imaging, including X-rays, can be attributed to the financial incentive
accruing to doctors who own these units, or obtain financial incentives
from pharmaceutical companies.”151 Even in the absence of financial
gain from procedures, the fact that frequently neither physicians nor
patients will bear the financial costs of ordering screening tests
encourages their use:
Patients want CAT scans because they want more information about
their headache and because they do not directly feel the cost of knowing
that information. Physicians want CAT scans because they want more
information, too often without critical analysis of whether that
information will be useful, and, to a certain extent, because our current
system of payment, particularly for care outside of the hospital, rewards
ever-greater use of technology.152

Health law and policy scholars have suggested approaches that would
incorporate cost-effective considerations into the assessment of some of
the health technologies discussed above, such as MRI and CT scans. Bill
Sage, for instance, suggests factoring “medical necessity into a system of
graduated cost-sharing for many treatments similar to that already in use
for prescription drug benefits” as a response to health plans’ tendency to
either deny coverage for an expensive screening examination or cover the
procedure in full “sometimes based on exaggerated information
regarding symptoms or risk factors submitted by the referring
physician.”153
151. Barbara P. Billauer, The Right to Health—A Holistic Health Plan for the Next
Administration, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 234, 264–65 (2007); see also Jackson Williams,
Sunshine Proposals for Imaging Ownership and Drug/Medical Device Manufacturer
Relationships: Physician Disclosures and the Limits of Consumerism in Health Care, 13 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 131, 131 (2010) (“Physicians are responsible for ordering imaging studies,
prescribing drugs, and choosing medical devices for implantation, and it is widely believed that
physicians’ decision making can be influenced by their financial interests. Researchers studying
physician ownership of imaging equipment have found that physicians who perform their own
imaging are 1.7 to 7.7 times as likely to order imaging as peers who do not.”).
152. Joel D. Howell, Diagnostic Technologies: X-Rays, Electrocardiograms and CAT Scans,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 562 (1991).
153. William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and
the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 639 (2003)
(“Currently, if a forty-something, male law professor in generally good health wants an expensive
screening examination such as a colonoscopy or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan, health

14_PERSAD_DOCUMENT9.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

620

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

2/10/2017 2:16 PM

[Vol. 48

Other scholars have similarly noted that the cost insensitivity of
medical-necessity determinations, and the dichotomy they draw between
necessary and unnecessary treatments, leads to the overuse of imaging
and screening.154 They argue, instead, to use “validated multi-level
ratings of medical necessity, based on clinical circumstances for a
majority of commonly performed and costly diagnostic and therapeutic
procedures,” and provide an example of how such a process could be
applied to the question of whether to perform an MRI for a patient with
lower back pain.155
[A] patient desiring an MRI during the first week of his symptoms could
be offered the procedure with a 50 percent co-pay. Alternatively,
should he elect to delay the imaging and try non-operative treatments,
but remain symptomatic and disabled by his back and leg symptoms
after a period of six to eight weeks, he would receive imaging with a
nominal or no co-pay since the failure of symptoms to follow the usual
pattern of spontaneous resolution places the patient in a different
clinical category where the benefits of imaging and decompressive
surgery of a disc herniation begin to outweigh the potential risks.156

This proposal represents a way of harnessing funding to implement the
suggestion in Part III.B that health screening be targeted to patients for
whom it would be especially beneficial, rather than provided universally
to all.
Even without a more general push to require that health care meet a
cost-effectiveness goal, many have argued that restrictions on certain
health care financing arrangements would help to curb the overuse of
screening. For instance, some have argued that physicians who own the
screening machines ought to be required to disclose to patients that they
stand to gain.157 Others argue that physicians ought to be restricted in
their capacity to self-refer patients for testing or prohibited entirely from
doing so.158
plans either deny coverage as unnecessary or cover the procedure in full . . . .”).
154. Ryan Abbott & Carl Stevens, Redefining Medical Necessity: A Consumer-Driven Solution
to the U.S. Health Care Crisis, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 949 (2014).
155. Id. at 959.
156. Id.
157. See Williams, supra note 151, at 132 (discussing the “Medicare Imaging Disclosure
Sunshine Act,” which “would require that when a physician self-refers for advanced imaging, the
referring physician inform the patient in writing that the patient may obtain the services elsewhere
and provide the patient with a written list of other suppliers”).
158. See generally Maureen Kwiecinski, Comment, Limiting Conflicts of Interest Arising from
Physician Investment in Specialty Hospitals, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 413 (2004) (discussing the
importance of self-referral restrictions and the potential flaws in the proposed self-referral
legislation).
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Efforts have also been made to better fund alternatives to health
theater. To promote high-touch medicine, Emanuel argues that payments
to health professionals should be “bundled” to reward treating an
individual throughout an illness, rather than paid based on the provision
of individual medical services.159 The push to coordinate medical care
via patient-centered medical homes is one prominent effort to use funding
to reintegrate high-touch norms into medical care. The Affordable Care
Act made explicit efforts to promote patient-centered medical homes,
defining them and establishing programs to support them with grant
funding.160 A recent study has examined how medical homes work to
realize “high-touch” values, including the goals of having an “ongoing
relationship for first-contact, continuous, and comprehensive care,” the
use of a physician-directed team that incorporates nurse practitioners and
uses team members to provide health counseling, and efforts to promote
enhanced access through open scheduling, expanded hours, and new
avenues of communication with physicians.161
B. Revising Liability and Responsibility
Another approach that might help to discourage health theater focuses
on legal liability. Again, as with financing, this can work in two ways:
legal liability regimes can reduce the incentives to engage in health
theater by making alternatives more attractive from a liability
perspective, or by making health theater less attractive by exposing it to
liability as well.
Many have identified “defensive medicine”—the practice of medicine
with a desire to avoid legal liability—as a major driver of health theater:

159. Emanuel, supra note 124 (“Extending high touch medicine . . . to average practices requires
helping doctors and hospitals redesign the way they deliver care, and this can happen only by
changing how they are paid. It is impossible to deliver high touch medicine in a fee-for-service
system that emphasizes quantity over quality.”).
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 256a-1 (2010) (defining a “patient-centered medical home” as a
“mode of care” that includes several patient-centered and care coordination elements); see also 42
U.S.C. § 280g-12 (2011) (supporting physicians in partnering with a “local, community-based
health worker who facilitates and provides assistance to primary care practices by implementing
quality improvement or system redesign, incorporating the principles of the patient-centered
medical home to provide high-quality, effective, efficient, and safe primary care”); 42 U.S.C. §
293k(a) (1999) (providing grants to train physicians in providing care via a patient-centered
medical home); see generally Alexandria A. Ottens, There’s No Place Like Home: Moving Towards
Patient-Centered Medical Homes for Healthcare Reform, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE 1 (2011) (describing the history of patient-centered medical homes and their inclusion
in the Affordable Care Act).
161. Jeanne M. Ferrante et al., Principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home and Preventive
Services Delivery, 8 ANNALS FAM. MED. 108, 108 (2010).
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In a national survey, “79% [of physicians] said they had ordered more
tests than they would, based only on professional judgment of what is
medically needed, and 91% have noticed other physicians ordering
more tests.” A 2005 survey in the Journal of the American Medical
Association found that virtually ninety-three percent of high-risk
specialists in Pennsylvania ordered unnecessary tests, performed
unwarranted diagnostic procedures, and referred patients for unneeded
consultations to protect themselves from litigation. In a 2008 survey,
eighty-three percent of Massachusetts physicians reported practicing
defensive medicine; the survey also concluded that about twenty-five
percent of all radiological imaging tests were ordered for defensive
purposes, and twenty-eight percent and thirty-eight percent,
respectively, of those surveyed admitted reducing the number of highrisk patients they saw and limiting the number of high-risk procedures
or services they performed.162

While defensive medicine is widely recognized as a problem,
identifying a solution has proven difficult. Proposals to cap damage
awards are blunt instruments, limiting justified recoveries as well as
unjustified ones, and it is unclear whether they are the most effective way
of limiting defensive medicine.163
A better solution may be to adopt reforms that ensure that superior
alternatives to health theater are given proper weight when assessing a
physician’s conduct. David Hyman suggests that “treating compliance
with authoritative treatment guidelines as an absolute bar to liability”
would be a superior way of limiting ineffective care.164 Such safe-harbor
proposals have won approval from Peter Orszag, the former director of
the White House Office of Management and Budget, and are seen as the
next wave of malpractice reforms.165 These proposals would work to
protect doctors who pursue the ex ante medically best course of action
(defined by authoritative guidelines) against lawsuits should a negative
outcome nonetheless result. Even if an absolute bar is unworkable or
162. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Constitutional Foundation for Federal Medical
Liability Reform, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 173, 193–94 (2012) (citing OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND
LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 4 (2002),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/72891/litrefm.pdf).
163. See David A. Hyman, What Lessons Should We Learn from the First Malpractice Crisis
of the Twenty-First Century?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 261, 268 (2009) (“[E]ven if everyone agrees that
defensive medicine is a serious problem (and not everyone does), it is hard to believe that a cap on
non-economic damages is the optimal strategy for doing something about it.”).
164. Id.
165. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 381 (2015).
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overbroad, other reforms may serve to reduce the risk of liability. For
instance, an empirical study found that providing patients with a decision
aid led mock jurors to be much less likely to find that failing to
automatically test all patients fell below an absolute standard of care.166
Another way of reducing health theater’s prevalence would be to raise
the liability risk of health theater, as well as, or instead of, decreasing the
liability risk of alternatives. This outcome is illustrated in a recent case
that held a physician liable for ordering unnecessary scans that exposed
his patient to slight, but unwarranted, radiation risks.167 It is also
exemplified by prosecutions of physicians who profit from performing
unnecessary medical tests for fraud.168
C. Investing in Public Health
A third possible approach to reducing the prevalence of health theater
is to reduce the need for it by expanding funding for public health
measures that aim to address threats to health. Many analyses have
suggested that the impact of population-wide, public health measures on
health can be larger than the impact of individual medical diagnosis or
treatment decisions.169
Public health interventions could reduce the prevalence of many of the
medical conditions that health theater targets—such as cancer,
cardiovascular disease, and metabolic disorders. For instance, rather than
universally screening children for dyslipidemia caused in part by an
unhealthy diet, public health interventions present the alternative of
making healthy nutritional options more attractive, both by raising the
price of unhealthy foods and by lowering the price of healthy ones.170
166. Michael J. Barry et al., Reactions of Potential Jurors to A Hypothetical Malpractice Suit
Alleging Failure to Perform a Prostate-Specific Antigen Test, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 396, 401
(2008).
167. Burns v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 974 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2011).
168. E.g., United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming the conviction
of a physician who “used his position as an internist to order unnecessary medical tests conducted
at his own clinic, thereby bilking patients, private insurance companies, and the government out of
thousands of dollars”).
169. E.g., Earl S. Ford & Simon Capewell, Proportion of the Decline in Cardiovascular
Mortality Disease Due to Prevention Versus Treatment: Public Health Versus Clinical Care, 32
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 5, 12 (2011) (finding that public health factors better explained the change
in cardiovascular disease mortality than did treatment factors); Thomas R. Frieden, A Framework
for Public Health Action: The Health Impact Pyramid, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 592, 592 (2010)
(“Changing the environmental context so that individuals can easily take heart-healthy actions in
the normal course of their lives can have a greater population impact than clinical interventions that
treat individuals.”).
170. E.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Taxing Food and Beverage Products: A Public Health
Perspective and a New Strategy for Prevention, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 999, 1015–17 (2013)
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Public health interventions targeting urban planning and factors such as
park access could also make it easier for children to exercise and be
active.171 Similarly, rather than screening for heart disease, society could
redirect resources toward interventions that reduce stress—a major cause
of heart disease.172
Infectious disease—another area where health theater has been
prominent—is also amenable to public health efforts. For example, some
airports screen and image traveling individuals to identify whether they
are suffering from infectious diseases such as fever.173 Advocates have
argued that, rather than attempting to keep infectious diseases out of their
countries via screening, developed countries would be wiser to invest in
initiatives that help prevent disease pandemics in the rest of the world.174
These public health efforts are not a panacea. Even with improved
public health measures, some individuals will still suffer from the
conditions that prompted health theater in the first place. And the few
individuals who do not benefit from public health efforts might receive
far more attention than the many who have been kept safe. But increased
investment in public health represents a sustainable and effective longterm strategy for improving health.
CONCLUSION
The conditions that create the demand for theater, whether health or
security, are not going away. Instability in the Middle East and the rise
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIS”) has produced at least
a perception of a resurgence in terror attacks. As officials discuss the
challenge of improving the security of even more locations—such as the
public areas of airports and major transit centers175—security theater will

(discussing the connection between sugar intake and dyslipidemia and suggesting efforts to limit
sugar intake via taxation combined with support for fruit and vegetable intake).
171. Donald R. Dengel et al., Does The Built Environment Relate To The Metabolic Syndrome
In Adolescents?, 15 HEALTH & PLACE 946, 949 (2009).
172. Marianna Virtanen et al., Overtime Work and Incident Coronary Heart Disease: The
Whitehall II Prospective Cohort Study, 31 EUR. HEART. J. 1737, 1737 (2010) (arguing that overtime
work contributes to heart disease).
173. For sources regarding the Zika virus, see infra note 178.
174. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, The Moral Challenge of Ebola, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 6,
8 (2015) (“In an interconnected world it is impossible to prevent the spread of disease by simply
walling off one’s country. The only effective and humane strategy is to attack the disease where it
arises.”).
175. Alan Levin & Jeff Plungis, Brussels Subway Death Toll Highlights Airport Security Focus,
BLOOMBERG (Mar 25, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0325/brussels-subway-death-toll-highlights-airport-security-focus.
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no doubt suggest itself as a likely response.176
Meanwhile, the expanding power of medical screening technology,
coupled with the financial rewards to be gained from deploying it, will
similarly make health theater a likely response to health threats. New
infectious disease threats, such as Zika, present themselves on the
horizon, and have already prompted calls for border screening by
prominent presidential candidates in the United States as well as the
adoption of such screening elsewhere,177 even though screening is
currently judged to be ineffective.178 In an overlap between health and
airport screening, some have argued that thermal imaging technology
installed at airports to detect travelers with fevers may create a false sense
of protection against a pandemic.179 Meanwhile, an aging population is
likely to lead to an increasing number of individuals who worry about
conditions such as cancer and heart disease, and look for the reassurance
that health theater promises to provide.
In the face of these ongoing challenges, the concept of health theater
represents a useful way of naming a problem and suggesting a pathway
to change. Those looking to limit the spread of health theater might look
176. E.g., id. (reporting statement by international president of Amalgamated Transit Union that
“we haven’t exercised anywhere near the same diligence with respect to transit facilities that we
have with airports and airlines”); Christopher A. Rogers, Note, A Slow March Towards Thought
Crime: How the Department of Homeland Security’s FAST Program Violates the Fourth
Amendment, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 346 (2014) (describing new screening program under
development by the Department of Homeland Security and stating that the Department “hopes that
the system will soon be ready for deployment in less controlled venues, such as mass transit portals
. . . . ”).
177. E.g., Letter from Sen. Marco Rubio to Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r for U.S. Customs &
Border
Prot.
(Jan.
29,
2016),
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=files.serve&File_id=6F40FF14-88FF-47609351-8920498D0F83 (“What steps is CBP taking to prepare for this outbreak, including the
potential screening of travelers from affected areas, particularly in Florida’s airports and
seaports?”); see also China Increases Zika Screening at Borders, CCTV AM. (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://www.cctv-america.com/2016/02/27/china-increases-zika-screening-at-borders
(“Body
temperature detectors first screen the arriving passengers of international flights.”); Sanchita
Sharma, India to Issue Travel Alert, Screen Passengers from Zika-Hit Countries, HINDUSTAN
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2016, 8:18 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/india-to-issue-travel-alertscreen-passengers-from-zika-hit-countries/story-i4V75B33GEtppEC5WlVr0H.html (describing
Zika screening at Indian and Sri Lankan airports).
178. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Zika Virus: DHS Response Plan (Feb. 11,
2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/11/zika-virus-dhs-response-plan (asserting that
“enhanced public health entry screening for Zika would not be effective because most people who
are infected with Zika are asymptomatic and therefore could not be identified during the screening
process”); Australian Government Department of Health, Border Measures to Protect Australia
from Zika, http://health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-zika-border (last updated
Mar. 2, 2016) (“Screening of travellers at the Australian border is not recommended at this time as
there is currently no practical mechanism to detect Zika virus in arriving passengers.”).
179. Ng et al., supra note 173, at 105.
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to the strategies adopted by critics of security theater, as well as to the
suggestions offered in this Article. While the impetus that motivates
health theater is likely to continue, identifying and criticizing its
manifestations can help to ensure that responses to health threats serve to
genuinely improve health, rather than merely creating the appearance of
security against disease.

